EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER
OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY
CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?
Eric Lorber∗
On March 19, 2011, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)
launched strike aircraft and tomahawk cruise missiles against Libya in the
opening phases of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the military intervention meant
1
to stem Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s attacks on Libya’s civilian population.
The purpose of these initial strikes was to destroy Libya’s command and
control facilities and its air defense network so that allied warplanes could fly
uncontested through Libyan airspace and attack marauding government
2
forces at will. This strategy—seizing air superiority in the early stages of a
military conflict and then proceeding to attack the enemy’s ground forces
and command systems—has been a hallmark of U.S. military operations in
3
the post-Cold War era.
Behind the scenes, however, the Obama administration and Pentagon
officials considered heavily modifying this battle-tested approach with a
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See Liz Sly, Greg Jaffe, and Craig Whitlock, U.S. and European officials say initial assault on
Gaddafi’s forces “very effective”; Libyan leader pledges “long, drawn-out war”, WASH. POST (Mar.
21, 2011, 12:07 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/03/19/AR2011031903274_pf.html (detailing the initial reports of successful
combat operations in Libya).
See Brad Knickerbocker, U.S. leads “Odyssey Dawn” initial attack on Libya, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Mar. 19, 2011, 7:19 PM), (“In essence, [the] attacks were meant to shape the
battle space so that coalition aircraft from other countries can safely enforce the no-fly
zone.”).
See MICHAEL R. GORDON & GENERAL BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS’ WAR 205–23
(1995) (illustrating the tension among U.S. generals during the first hours of the Persian
Gulf War when the United States launched a large attack against an impressive Iraqi air
defense network using stealth aircraft); David A. Fulghum, Fast Forward: The Pentagon’s
Force-Transformation Director Takes an Early Swipe at What Worked and What Didn’t in Iraq,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 2003, at 34–35 (describing the U.S. attack on Iraqi air
defenses during Operation Iraqi Freedom that effectively disabled Iraq’s ability to contest
U.S. air superiority throughout the 2003 campaign).
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4

radical, new addition: offensive cyberattacks. In the lead-up to the March
19 attack, the administration debated disabling and destroying the Libyan
air defense network and command and control nodes through concerted
computer attacks that would prevent Libyan radars from effectively tracking
5
allied aircraft.
During these discussions, the administration raised a
number of questions without clear answers, most notably whether a
cyberattack could trigger invocation of the requirements of the War Powers
6
Resolution. Although ultimately deciding to rely on more traditional
kinetic operations, the administration’s internal discussions highlight an
emerging area of importance and uncertainty in both national security and
the law: what domestic legal rules do and should govern the use of offensive
cyber operations (“OCOs”), and how do these new capabilities play into the
long-standing debate over the proper balance between congressional and
7
executive war-making power?
Yet a surprising amount of uncertainty exists as to which—if any—
domestic laws constrain the use of OCOs and how they fit into the
congressional-executive balance. As policymakers, scholars, and journalists
have lamented, a coherent policy framework governing the use of OCOs
8
does not exist and many questions remain unanswered. Would an attack
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See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks to Weaken Libya, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A1 (describing a debate within the Obama Administration as to
the wisdom—and legality—of using cyberattacks in operations against Libya in 2011).
For the purposes of this Comment, I define “cyberattacks” as “efforts to alter, disrupt, or
destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them . . . .
[E]ncompassing activities that range in target (military versus civilian, public versus
private), consequences (minor versus major, direct versus indirect), and duration
(temporary versus long-term) . . . .” Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of
Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 422 (2011) (arguing that, for
the foreseeable future, the United States will have to operate in an international legal
environment that is unclear regarding whether cyberattacks constitute a use of force).
Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 4.
See id.; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006).
See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995);
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); LOUIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR (1990); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR:
THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW (2d ed. 1989); Robert H. Bork,
Erosion of the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 693 (1990); Henry P.
Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV., Special Issue 1970, at 19; W. Michael
Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT’L L.
203 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow, “Once More Unto the Breach”: The War Powers Resolution
Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
See Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA Nominee for Commander,
United States Cyber Command: Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th Cong. 9 (Apr. 15,
2010), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/04%20April/
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using cyber weapons trigger the requirements of the War Powers
9
Resolution? Would OCOs be subject to reporting requirements under the
10
Intelligence Authorization Act? Conversely, do cyber operations grant the
executive branch another tool with which it can prosecute attacks but avoid
reporting and responding to congressional inquiries? These questions are
largely unanswered both because the rise of OCOs is a relatively recent
phenomenon and because much of the information about U.S. technical
11
capability in this field is highly classified.
Yet addressing these questions is increasingly important for two reasons.
First, as states such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States use these
weapons now and likely will do so more in future conflicts, determining the
domestic legal strictures governing their use would provide policymakers
12
and military planners a better sense of how to operate in cyberspace.
Second, the possible employment of these tools adds yet another wrinkle to
the battle between the executive and legislative branches over war-making
13
authority.
In particular, if neither the War Powers Resolution nor the
Intelligence Authorization Act governs OCOs, the executive may be allowed
to employ U.S. military power in a manner largely unchecked by
14
congressional authority.
As a result, the employment of these tools
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Alexander%2004-15-10.pdf [hereinafter Advance Questions] (“President Obama’s
cybersecurity sixty-day study highlighted the mismatch between our technical capabilities
to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies, and our civilian leadership is
working hard to resolve the mismatch.”); Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyberattacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyberattacks] (discussing the so-far-unsuccessful attempts to establish a coherent legal
framework governing offensive cyber operations).
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541a (2006) (“[T]he purpose [is] to . . . insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances . . . .”).
50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006) (regulating the use and reporting of covert action).
DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934 (Nov. 2011),
at 5 [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT] (responding to
congressional inquiries as to how the Defense Department plans on using offensive cyber
capabilities in future operations).
See infra Part I.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
For example, if, in the case of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the United States had decided to
use cyberattacks to disable Libyan air defense systems, such an attack may not have
triggered the reporting and removal requirements explicit in the War Powers Resolution.
See infra Part IV. Though the Obama Administration argued that its military activities in
Libya did not constitute hostilities for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution—and
therefore did not trigger its reporting requirements—if U.S. forces were actively engaged
in combat for a longer period of time such that the activities did constitute hostilities,
determining whether cyberattacks trigger the War Powers clock would become critical in
establishing when the executive was required to report and remove troops absent
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implicates—and perhaps problematically shifts—the balance between the
15
and Congress’s war-making
executive’s commander-in-chief power
16
authority.
This Comment provides an initial answer to the question of whether
17
current U.S. law can effectively govern the Executive’s use of OCOs. It
explores the interaction between this new tool and the current statutory
limits on presidential war-making authority, with a particular focus on
whether the two current federal laws meant to restrict executive power in
18
this field—the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization
19
Act —apply to a wide range of potential offensive cyber operations
undertaken by the executive branch. Beyond suggesting that neither the
War Powers Resolution nor the Intelligence Authorization Act can effectively
regulate most types of offensive cyber operations, this Comment suggests
that while marginally problematic for a proper balance of war-making power
between the executive and legislative branches, this lack of oversight does
not fundamentally shift the current alignment. It does argue, however,
that—given this lack of regulatory oversight—the President now has another
powerful war-making tool to use at his discretion. Finally, the Comment
suggests that this lack of limitation may be positive in some ways, as laying
down clear legal markers before having a developed understanding of these
capabilities may problematically limit their effective use.
This Comment proceeds by addressing these issues in five sections. Part
I introduces the recent increase in offensive cyber operations and
capabilities, both by the United States and other countries. It also discusses
the underdeveloped nature of the law governing OCOs in the United States.
Part II provides an overview of offensive cyber operations, specifically laying
out a spectrum upon which different operations would fall (i.e., as stand-
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congressional approval of the action. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser,
U.S. Dep’t of State) [hereinafter Libya War Powers] (“[A] combination of four factors
present in Libya suggests that the current situation does not constitute the kind of
‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day automatic pullout
provision.”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“Congress shall have power . . . To declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water . . . .”).
This Comment explicitly does not address current U.S. legislative efforts to craft a
framework that protects the private sector from foreign cyberattacks.
See, e.g.,
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006) (restricting the deployment of U.S. soldiers in major
combat operations for extended periods of time without the consent of either the
President or Congress).
50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006).
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alone operations or as a tactical supplement to major combat operations).
Establishing this spectrum facilitates categorization of cyber operations and
helps determine which domestic statutory framework would govern a
particular type of operation.
Part III examines cyber operations through the prism of the War Powers
Resolution, noting that while the Resolution is likely constitutional, an
analysis of its language, Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinions
interpreting it, and case law suggests that it does not cover the use of
offensive cyberattacks even if used as part of major military campaigns. Part
IV examines whether the Intelligence Authorization Act provides Congress
with regulatory power over stand-alone and covert operations, suggesting
that, given its weak information-sharing requirements and substantially
malleable language, the Act does not provide Congress with an effective
regulatory mechanism. Part V discusses the implications of this lack of
federal statutory coverage, in particular suggesting both that these new types
of capabilities do not represent a substantial shift in the balance of warmaking authority between the executive and the legislative branches and
that, while critics lament the fact that it does not rein in presidential actions,
the conclusion that it should is premature.

I.

DEVELOPING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES, UNDERDEVELOPING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Over the past five years, offensive cyber operations have become an
20
increasingly frequent element of, inter alia, major combat operations,
21
22
coercive diplomacy, and attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation.
20

21

David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study:
Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS J., Jan. 6, 2011,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyberwar-case-study-georgia-2008 (providing an indepth assessment of how the Russians utilized cyberattacks before the start of kinetic
operations to make those operations substantially more effective).
Ian Traynor, Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia, GUARDIAN, May 17,
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html.
On coercive
diplomacy more generally, see Robert J. Art, Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?, in
THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin eds.,
2003). The academic literature on coercion theory is vast and spans many decades. See,
e.g., RICHARD K. BETTS, NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND NUCLEAR BALANCE (1987); ALEXANDER
L. GEORGE, FORCEFUL PERSUASION: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR
(1991); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1974); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT (1980); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); GLENN H. SNYDER
& PAUL DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: BARGAINING, DECISION MAKING, AND SYSTEM
STRUCTURE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1977). For more recent works that have made an
important contribution to the theory and the analysis of the empirical record, see DANIEL
BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT (2002); KENNETH A. SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY AND
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (2001).
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During this period, they have received a great deal of attention as newly
effective methods of waging war, and indeed the United States, concerned
both with developing defensive measures against enemies employing these
capabilities, as well as determining how it will use its own offensive
capabilities, has begun organizing around the notion that offensive cyber
23
operations will constitute an important component of future warfare. Yet
during this time frame, despite the development and consideration of the
employment of these capabilities, U.S. policymakers have been unable to
effectively develop a legal framework for when they can and cannot be
24
used. The following discussion details some of the most notable public
instances of the employment of offensive cyber operations over the past halfdecade. It also describes how many policymakers and military strategists
believe that cyber operations will become even more important in future
combat operations.
It then proceeds to discuss the comparatively
underdeveloped legal rules and regulations governing the United States’ use
of such weapons.

A. Cyber Warfare Outside the U.S. Context
In what some journalists called the “world’s first cyberwar,” hackers
linked to the Russian government attacked Estonian government websites
25
and infrastructure in April and May of 2007. In a series of attacks lasting
approximately one month, Russian-linked hackers, responding to the
removal of a Soviet statue in a port city, “came close to shutting down the
country’s digital infrastructure, clogging the Web sites of the president, the
prime minister, Parliament and other government agencies, staggering

22

23

24

25

RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBERWAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL
SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 3–8 (2010) (suggesting that Israel took down Syrian
air defenses with a cyberattack during its 2007 raid on Syria’s nuclear reactor).
Siobhan Gorman & Yochi Dreazen, Military Command Is Created for Cyber Security, WALL ST.
J., June 24, 2009, at A6 (detailing the establishment of Cyber Command to conduct
offensive and defensive cyber operations); see also Donna Miles, Gates Establishes New Cyber
Subcommand, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (June 24, 2009), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54890
(announcing
the
establishment of CYBERCOM).
Stewart Baker, Denial of Service, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM, Sept. 30, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial_of_service?page=0,0
(detailing the various, inchoate attempts to rein in cyber operations with outdated legal
concepts).
Steven Lee Myers, Estonia Computers Blitzed, Possibly by the Russians, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2007, at A8 (providing an early assessment of how Russian-linked hackers—despite the
Kremlin’s denials—waged a cyber war against Estonia); Traynor, supra note 21; see also
Jose Nazario, Estonian DDoS Attacks—A summary to date, ARBOR NETWORKS SEC. BLOG (May
17, 2007), http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-todate/ (providing a detailed assessment of how Estonia’s networks were taken down).
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Estonia’s biggest bank and overwhelming the sites of several daily
26
newspapers.” The attackers used a network of “bots”—computers slaved to
master servers and spread as widely as the United States and Vietnam—to
overload Estonia’s networks and shut down its ability to process
27
information. These Denial of Service (“DoS”) and Distributed Denial of
Service (“DDoS”) attacks had a substantial effect on Estonia that went
beyond making it impossible for Internet users to browse government
websites; by attacking bank sites, the hackers were able to shut down online
28
services and cause significant losses for financial firms.
Though Russia
denied any link to the hackers, many in the cyber community—as well as in
29
Estonia—believed the Russian government was responsible. The incident
raised two primary points of concern among national security officials and
analysts around the world. First, though cyberattacks to steal information
have been occurring for a long time (popularly dubbed “cyber
30
exploitation”), many thought this episode represented the first time a
nation had employed a large-scale cyberattack to disable or destroy another
31
country’s infrastructure. Second, compared to many other nations, experts
considered Estonia to be particularly well prepared to deal with cyberattacks,
as the government had teams and plans in place that actively confronted
32
each intrusion throughout the episode.
However, the Estonian attacks represented only one type of OCO
undertaken in the past five years and likely the least damaging to the
33
intended target. In that case, though hackers were able to disrupt financial
26

27

28
29

30
31
32

33

Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at 1 (detailing the initial attacks and providing a more
substantial overview of the Russian-linked campaign); see also ENEKEN TIKK ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14–35 (2010) (providing a
comprehensive overview, including substantial background information, of the attacks on
Estonia).
Landler & Markoff, supra note 26; John Robb, When Bots Attack, WIRED, Sept. 2007, at 166,
167 (laying out hypothetical scenarios for how China could launch a major bot attack
against the United States and effectively disrupt the U.S. economy).
Landler & Markoff, supra note 26, at A1.
Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Def. of Est., Remarks at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies: Cyberspace: A New Security Dimension at Our Fingertips (Nov. 28,
2007), available at http://csis.org/event/statesmens-forum-jaak-aaviksoo-minister-defenserepublic-estonia (suggesting that Russia was responsible for the coordinated attack).
See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
See Landler & Markoff, supra note 26.
See TIKK ET AL., supra note 26, at 24; Landler & Markoff, supra note 26; Newly Nasty, THE
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 63 (suggesting that, following the mass-hacker attack against
Estonia, most countries remained unprepared for this type of strike).
Interestingly, the damage of offensive cyber operations can spread far more broadly than
their initial targets. See John Bumgarner & Scott Borg, U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit,
Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign Against Georgia in August of 2008, at 1 (2009),
available at http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-
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services and government websites, the long-term damage—to say nothing of
34
the kinetic effects such as actual destruction—was limited. Other countries
have begun to use OCOs in more complex ways, particularly in conjunction
with military operations. In 2008, during the Russian-Georgian war, the
Russians—or Russian citizens operating with government approval—used
denial of service attacks to disable government websites and prevent the
35
Georgian authorities from providing information to the public.
In
addition, the attacks made it more difficult for the government to transmit
data to international observers and convince other countries of the
36
magnitude of the Russian military assault. The Russians also linked their
OCOs with traditional kinetic operations for added effect; cyberattacks
disrupted military communications between Georgian units and decreased
37
the effectiveness of the Georgian defensive response. According to military
analyst David Hollis: “This appear[ed] to be the first case in history of a
coordinated cyberspace domain attack synchronized with major combat
actions in the other warfighting domains (consisting of Land, Air, Sea, and
38
Space).” Further, analysts believe that this tight linkage between kinetic

34
35

36
37

38

Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf (providing an in-depth examination of Russia’s use of
cyber operations against Georgia and suggesting that the 2008 Russian attack on
Georgian servers had long-term echoes, with disruptions hitting Twitter and Facebook
worldwide in 2009 as a direct result of the attack). This phenomenon of cyberattacks
spreading more broadly than their intended targets is not limited to the Georgian case.
See Robert McMillian, Was Stuxnet Built to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Program?, PCWORLD (Sept.
21,
2010,
4:10
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/
205827/was_stuxnet_built_to_attack_irans_nuclear_program.html
(suggesting
that
though the Stuxnet worm may have been created to attack centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz’s
nuclear energy facility, it damaged a wide range of industrial targets in India and
Indonesia as well).
TIKK ET AL., supra note 26, at 24–25.
Id. at 77–79; see also Noah Shachtman, Top Georgian Official: Moscow Cyber Attacked Us—We
Just Can’t Prove It, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2009, 7:32 AM), http://www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2009/03/georgia-blames/ (detailing how, despite invading the country, the
Russian government denied that it employed its offensive cyber weaponry against
Georgia).
Others disagree with this portrayal.
For example, the U.S. Cyber
Consequences Unit suggested,
The cyber attacks against Georgian targets were carried out by civilians with little
or no direct involvement on the part of the Russian government or military. . . .
The organizers of the cyber attacks had advance notice of Russian military
intentions, and they were tipped off about the timing of the Russian military
operations . . . .
Bumgarner & Borg, supra note 33, at 2–3.
TIKK ET AL., supra note 26, at 77–79.
Robert Haddick, This Week at War: Lessons from Cyberwar I, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Jan. 28,
2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/28/this_week_at_war_lessons_
from_cyberwar_i (suggesting that Russia effectively coordinated its diplomatic, military,
and cyber strategy to bring a great deal of coercive power to bear on Georgia); Hollis,
supra note 20, at 2–5.
Hollis, supra note 20, at 2.
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and cyber operations will become standard operating protocol in future
39
military operations.
In addition, the Israelis reportedly linked their cyber and kinetic
operations—and plan to do so in the future—in conflicts against regional
adversaries. In 2007, the Israelis launched Operation Orchard, a strike
against a purported nuclear reactor being built in Syria with North Korean
40
help. Israeli aircraft penetrated Syrian airspace without detection or attack
41
from Syria’s air defense network. Analysts believe that the Israelis were
able to slip into Syrian airspace with non-stealthy aircraft due to a
cyberattack—perhaps in the form of a kill switch that Israeli saboteurs
placed inside electronics delivered to Syria—that disabled the air defense
42
network. Given the success of this operation, and particularly the fact that
no Israeli aircraft were lost, many analysts believe that the Israelis will use a
43
similar strategy if they decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.
The
likelihood of future combatants deploying advanced cyberattacks alongside
more traditional military forces is not limited to Israel and Russia. Notably,
the Chinese have developed extensive OCOs designed to slow down
deployments of U.S. troops into the Pacific theater in case of a U.S.-Chinese

39

40

41

42

43

See, e.g., Ben Arnoldy, Cyberspace: New Frontier in Conflicts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
13, 2008, at 2 (arguing that Russia’s use of offensive cyber operations portends the future
integration of this capability into combat operations).
Mark Heinrich, IAEA suspects Syrian nuclear activity at bombed site, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2010,
4:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/18/us-nuclear-syria-iaea-idUSTRE
61H66320100218 (“[T]he International Atomic Energy Agency lent public support to
Western suspicions that Israel’s target was a nascent nuclear reactor that Washington said
was North Korean in design and geared to making weapons-grade plutonium.”).
See David A. Fulghum & Douglas Barrie, Israel used electronic attack in air strike against Syrian
mystery target, ABC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/
story?id=3702807&page=1#.UJFmC47mWwo (exploring the electronic technology behind
Israel’s cyberattack which purportedly prevented advanced Syrian air defense systems
from detecting inbound Israeli aircraft).
CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 22, at 3–8; Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, IEEE
SPECTRUM (May 2008), http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/the-hunt-forthe-kill-switch/0 (“Among the many mysteries still surrounding that strike was the failure
of a Syrian radar—supposedly state-of-the-art—to warn the Syrian military of the
incoming assault. . . . [Many] speculated that the commercial off-the-shelf
microprocessors in the Syrian radar might have been purposely fabricated with a hidden
‘backdoor’ inside.”).
Eli Lake, Israel’s Secret Iran Attack Plan: Electronic Warfare, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:28
PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/16/israel-s-secret-iran-attack-planelectronic-warfare.html (detailing how Israel would use offensive cyber operations in
future conflicts to attack not only Iran’s air defense networks, but also its “electric grid,
Internet, cellphone [sic] network, and emergency frequencies for firemen and police
officers”).
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conflict and to reduce their effectiveness once deployed, principally by
44
attacking U.S. communication nodes.

B. The United States and Offensive Cyber Capabilities
While these countries have been developing offensive cyber capabilities,
the United States arguably has “the world’s most powerful and sophisticated
45
offensive cyberattack capability.” According to the former chief technology
officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “[w]e have U.S. warriors in
46
cyberspace that are deployed overseas” and “live in adversary networks.”
Indeed, the United States was responsible for one of the first cyberattacks,
47
targeting the Soviet Union in 1982.
Over the past decade, the United
States has begun to devote an increasing amount of attention to defending
against offensive cyber operations while developing its own offensive
48
capabilities.
In 2009, the United States set up Cyber Command
(“CYBERCOM”), co-housed with the National Security Agency, to help
49
secure U.S. systems from cyberattack.
While initially billed as a way to
better streamline the United States’ ability to defend itself against cyber
operations, it quickly became apparent that a major mission of the new
command was to develop and deploy offensive cyber weaponry across the
globe. Indeed, General Keith Alexander, the chief of Cyber Command and
the director of the National Security Agency, has expressed a desire to have

44

45
46
47

48
49

See Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and
Computer Network Exploitation, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, at 23–24 (2009)
(describing China’s current doctrine and how it might be employed in a national conflict
with the United States).
Jack Goldsmith, Can we stop the cyber arms race?, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2010, at A17.
Id.
See THOMAS C. REED, AT THE ABYSS: AN INSIDER’S HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR (2004)
(detailing a cyberattack on Soviet gas refining capabilities in 1982 which had substantial
blowback effects by infecting and damaging non-targets).
CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 22.
Gorman & Dreazen, supra note 23, at A6 (detailing the establishment of CYBERCOM to
conduct both offensive and defensive cyber operations); see also Miles, supra note 23
(announcing the establishment of CYBERCOM). Interestingly, CYBERCOM is tasked
with defending military websites, whereas the Department of Homeland Security is tasked
with defending civilian cyber infrastructure. As a result, the United States civilian
infrastructure is less prepared than the military infrastructure to defend against
cyberattacks. See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyber-attacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2010, at A7 (“[I]n testimony to Congress in September, [General Keith Alexander, head
of Cyber Command] warned that Cyber Command could not currently defend the
country against cyber-attack because it ‘is not my mission to defend today the entire
nation.’ If an adversary attacked power grids, he added, a defensive effort would ‘rely
heavily on commercial industry.’”).
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“sufficient maneuvering room for his new command to mount what he has
50
called ‘the full spectrum of operations’ in cyberspace.”
Since the creation of Cyber Command, U.S. offensive cyber capabilities
51
have come into greater focus. Through leaks of classified information,
U.S. journalists have provided the public with a glimpse of a number of
offensive cyber operations conducted over a years-long time frame. Most
notably, in June 2012, New York Times reporter David Sanger revealed that
the United States—collaborating with Israel—had launched an
unprecedented, coordinated series of cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear
52
program, code-named “Olympic Games.”
Even after one of the core
elements of Olympic Games, the Stuxnet virus, began affecting systems
outside of Iran’s nuclear industry, the United States continued launching
53
similar assaults against Iran. More recently, another computer program
54
targeting Iran’s nuclear industry, the Flame virus, also became public. In
contrast to Stuxnet, which attacked certain computer systems it infected, the
United States and Israel jointly developed Flame to covertly steal key secrets
55
about Iran’s nuclear program after infecting Iranian systems.
Despite these leaks of classified information, offensive cyber capabilities
remain one of the U.S. government’s most closely-guarded secrets. For
example, in its recently released Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, the
56
Department of Defense did not mention its offensive capabilities. Further,
in response to congressional questions during the debates over the 2011

50

51

52

53
54

55
56

Nakashima, supra note 49, at A1 (suggesting that “[o]ffensive actions could include
shutting down part of an opponent’s computer network to preempt a cyber-attack against
a U.S. target or changing a line of code in an adversary’s computer to render malicious
software harmless. They are operations that destroy, disrupt or degrade targeted
computers or networks”).
Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon: Cyber offense part of U.S. strategy, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2011,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/pentagon-cyber-offense-part-of-us-strategy/
2011/11/15/glQArEAIPN_story.html (“The Pentagon is prepared to launch cyberattacks
in response to hostile actions that threaten the government, military or U.S.
economy . . . .”).
David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2012, at 1 [hereinafter Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran]
(elaborating on how the United States and the Israelis co-developed a number of
different viruses to both gather intelligence on—and disrupt—Iranian nuclear facilities).
Id.
Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller, & Julie Tate, U.S. and Israel created ‘Flame’, WASH. POST,
June 20, 2012, at A1 (“The United States and Israel jointly developed a sophisticated
computer virus nicknamed Flame that collected intelligence in preparation for cybersabotage aimed at slowing Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon, according to
Western officials with knowledge of the effort.”).
Id.
DEP’T OF DEF. STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE (2011) (detailing how the U.S.
government would develop robust defenses and partner with the private sector to assure
integrity of its cyber systems).
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National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense did not
directly address—at least in an unclassified forum—the extent of U.S.
57
offensive cyber capabilities, nor the policies governing them. However, it
did reference that these capabilities exist: “[T]he Department has the
capability to conduct offensive operations. . . . DoD will conduct offensive
cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and legal
regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the
58
law of armed conflict.”
These limited references to offensive cyber operations, including how
existing legal principles may govern them, are becoming more frequent in
public discussions, however. For example, in its Cyberspace Policy Report,
the Department of Defense indirectly alluded to such capabilities by briefly
touching on the application of the War Powers Resolution to cyberspace:
“Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces
personnel into the area of hostilities. Cyber operations may, however, be a
component of larger operations that could trigger notification and
59
reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution.” Though not
discussing specific U.S. policies or capabilities, such statements echo the
idea—explored above in the Russian, Israeli, and Chinese cases—that the
United States is actively planning to utilize cyber operations in future
conflicts. And in one of the most transparent discussions of U.S. OCOs to
date, General Alexander appeared before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in 2010 and answered questions about CYBERCOM’s mission,
60
including its offensive activities.
In response to advance questions by
senators, he noted that CYBERCOM would serve “as the focal point for
61
deconfliction of DOD offensive cyberspace operations.” More recently, in
the 2012 House Conference Report for the National Defense Authorization
Act, Congress specifically recognized U.S. offensive cyber capabilities:
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and
upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in
cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to (1) the
policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for
kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War
62
Powers Resolution. . . .

57
58
59
60
61
62

DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 2–9.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 9.
Advance Questions, supra note 8 (suggesting that the United States is developing, and will
deploy, greater offensive cyber capabilities in the future).
Id. at 1.
H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, at 255–56 (2011) (Conf. Rep.). See also id. at 686 (“[T]here is a
lack of historical precedent for what constitutes traditional military activities in relation to
cyber operations and [] it is necessary to affirm that such operations may be conducted
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Further, as discussed, in the recent Libyan intervention, the Obama
administration has actively considered using its offensive cyber capabilities in
63
The instances above suggest that
conjunction with kinetic operations.
many countries—the United States among them—are developing and
deploying offensive cyber capabilities both as tools of deterrence and for
war-fighting purposes. Further, these comments and documents suggest
that in the United States, policymakers are beginning to grapple with how
these new technologies may fall under current legal regimes and potentially
alter the war-making balance between Congress and the President.

C. The United States, Offensive Cyber Capabilities, and Legal Gaps
While a large body of scholarship speaks to the question of whether—
and how—international law governs the use of cyber weapons, few scholars
have addressed the issue of whether U.S. domestic law provides guidance as
to when and how these tools can be employed and whether Congress
currently has the ability to effectively regulate their use. Since the late
1990s, scholars and practitioners have grappled with a number of issues
related to whether cyberattacks constitute armed attacks, justify self-defense,
64
or create national obligations to assist other countries under cyberattack.
In particular, international law scholars have considered whether offensive
65
cyberattacks constitute the use of armed force under the UN Charter.
They have suggested that such conclusions should be determined by the
66
damage inflicted. Other scholars have looked to past instances of actions
short of the use of kinetic force, such as economic sanctions, to argue that
67
cyberattacks likely constitute acts of aggression.
Likewise, academics,

63
64

65
66

67

pursuant to the same policy, principles, and legal regimes that pertain to kinetic
capabilities.”).
Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 4.
DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION
OPERATIONS (May 1999), at 8–10, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/
dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf (arguing that cyberattacks may not constitute armed attacks
under international law); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force
in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885,
885 (1999) (“This Article explores the acceptability under the jus ad
bellum . . . [c]oncluding that traditional applications of the use of force prohibition fail to
adequately safeguard shared community values threatened by [computer network
attacks].”).
See, e.g., Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 73 (2002).
See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Laws of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87
(2010) (concluding that the question of whether cyberattacks are considered “armed
attacks” in international law should be answered with an eye as to their negative effects).
See, e.g., Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. AND POL. 57 (2001) (suggesting that economic sanctions are not as
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examining similar questions, have asserted either that international law
cannot—as currently understood—effectively deal with these issues, or that,
68
for the foreseeable future, such questions will not be clarified. Others have
69
explored when cyberattacks can justify legitimate acts of self-defense.
Beyond the academy, policymakers have also actively discussed whether and
70
how international law governs the use of offensive cyber operations.
While many in the public sphere have paid a great deal of attention to
the legality of offensive cyber operations, far less attention has been devoted
to how domestic law interacts with the United States’ employment of these
capabilities. Indeed, policymakers have repeatedly noted “the mismatch
between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing
71
laws and policies.” Over the past few years, studies have suggested that the
United States has not developed such a legal framework and that whether
current U.S. law—such as the War Powers Resolution—can regulate OCOs
72
remains under-analyzed.
While some argue that attempting to develop
such a framework will severely hamper the United States’ ability to effectively
73
conduct offensive cyber operations in future conflicts, most analysts agree
that “[t]oday’s policy and legal framework for guiding and regulating the
74
U.S. use of cyberattack is ill-formed, undeveloped, and highly uncertain.”
To this point, most of the debate as to the legality of these operations has
75
remained behind government doors. Indeed, until very recently, scholars

68

69

70

71
72

73

74
75

damaging as cyberattacks and merely represent a cessation of trade with a target country,
not an active attack on that country’s infrastructure).
Duncan Hollis, New Tools, New Rules: International Law and Information Operations,
(Temple Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-15), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009224 (asserting that the current
system of international law as applied to information operations such as cyberattacks
“suffers from several, near-fatal conditions”); Waxman, supra note 4.
Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 208–09 (2002) (suggesting that
offensive cyber operations constitute a use of force).
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S.
ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 241–82 (William A. Owens, Kenneth
W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (providing a wide-ranging overview of how different
elements of international law might apply to cyberattacks).
Advance Questions, supra note 8, at 9.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 233 (“This report does not seek to resolve
this controversy [as to whether the War Powers Resolution governs offensive cyber
operations], but observes that notions of cyberconflict and cyberattack will inevitably
cause more confusion and result in less clarity.”).
See Stewart Baker, Denial of Service, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial_of_service?page=0,0
(detailing the various, inchoate attempts to rein in cyber operations with outdated legal
concepts).
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 4.
See Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyber-attacks, supra note 8, at A1.
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have not paid substantial attention to these issues. To date, only a few
76
77
78
articles, blog postings, and a National Resource Council report have
delved into this issue in any detail.
This lack of attention creates a series of problems in determining
whether and how to regulate these operations. Most notably, before even
addressing whether a new framework should be developed, the question
arises as to whether the current domestic legal framework can govern the
employment of these capabilities. Although many policymakers have
suggested the current framework cannot govern OCOs, this question
remains to be closely examined and argued. Only if the existing framework
is found inadequate should legal scholars and practitioners design a new
legal framework. Indeed, if, as Matthew Waxman argues, “strategy is a . . .
79
driver of legal evolution,” then new legal mechanisms may be required to
ensure proper limitations on the executive’s war-making abilities.
Though a full accounting of the potential domestic legal mechanisms
governing the use of offensive cyber weapons is beyond the scope of this
Comment, a first step in determining whether the current legal framework
can be effective, at least partially, in governing the uses of these new
weapons is to examine whether an appropriate procedural system exists as to
regulate when and how they are employed. Though not delving into
specifics about the use of these weapons, an operative, procedural
framework that allows other governmental branches to review, understand,
and potentially check the uses of these weapons provides an initial move
towards their effective regulation. Though it may not be sufficient to fully
clarify when and how the use of offensive cyber weapons may be legal, such a
system at least would allow for oversight and hold the promise of helping
policymakers better understand the conditions under which they can
lawfully use these tools.

76

77

78
79

See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50
Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539 (2012) (discussing how Congress, through the
Intelligence Authorization Act, may be able to rein in the executive’s use of cyber
capabilities); Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 155 (2010) (describing the lack of sufficient federal laws governing cyber
operations, particularly in the relationship between the legislative and executive).
Jack Goldsmith, Quick Thoughts on the USG’s Refusal to Use Cyberattacks in Libya, LAWFARE
(Oct. 18, 2011, 7:48 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/quick-thoughts-on-theaborted-u-s-cyberattacks-on-libya/ (discussing why the Obama Administration decided not
to use cyber warfare at the commencement of the Libya campaign); Julian Ku, Do
Cyberattacks Fall Under the War Powers Act?, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 18, 2011, 8:15 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/10/18/do-cyberattacks-fall-under-the-war-powers-act/
(raising the question in relation to the Libya case but not answering it).
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70.
Waxman, supra note 4, at 425.
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To this end, this Comment examines the two primary statutory tools
through which Congress has tried to regulate executive military action: the
War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act. There are
two reasons to focus on these statutes. First, they apply to instances in which
offensive cyber weapons will most likely be employed outside of surveillance
and espionage actions: covert actions to disable and disrupt adversary
systems and capabilities, and overt actions taken in conjunction with kinetic
operations to degrade an adversary’s ability to effectively conduct combat
operations. Second, they are the primary means through which Congress
has attempted to constrain the President’s exercise of his constitutional
80
Commander-in-Chief function. Historically, and particularly since 1970,
Congress has been reluctant to use its primary power, the power of the
81
purse, to defund military activities, utilizing it only a handful of times. As
recent controversies over funding for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as
the intervention in Libya illustrate, threatening to defund ongoing military
operations is politically delicate and many legislators prefer to avoid taking
82
such action. Before proceeding to analyze OCOs through the prism of
these two statutes, however, sharpening our understanding of the different
types of OCOs is necessary.

II.

TYPOLOGIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS

Cyberattacks are “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or
networks or the information or programs on them . . . [,] encompassing
activities that range in target (military versus civilian, public versus private),
consequences (minor versus major, direct versus indirect), and duration
83
(temporary versus long-term).”
While this definition provides broad

80
81

82

83

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States . . . .”).
RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20775, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF
FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS
DEPLOYMENTS (2001) [hereinafter GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS
SINCE 1970] (detailing congressional actions to cut off funding under the Constitution
for U.S. troops abroad).
See Matthew Yglesias, Lack of Congressional Authorization for Use of Force is an Abdication of
Responsibility, Not a Power Grab, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Mar. 20, 2011, 6:30 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/03/20/200278/lack-of-congressionalauthorization-for-use-of-force-is-an-abdication-of-responsibility-not-a-power-grab/ (“Even
if you completely leave the declaration of war business aside, congress’ [sic] control over
the purse strings still gives a determined congressional majority ample latitude to restrain
presidential foreign policy. The main reason congress [sic] tends, in practice, not to use
this authority is that congress [sic] rarely wants to.”).
Waxman, supra note 4, at 422. For an alternate, though similar, definition, see Herbert S.
Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 63, 63 (2010)
(“‘[C]yber attack’ refers to the use of deliberate actions and operations—perhaps over an
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guidance as to what may constitute a cyberattack, for the purposes of
applying existing legal structures, the definition must be conceptualized in a
way that usefully fits into those preexisting regimes. Because of the
complexity and great number of potential means of cyberattack, this
Comment groups such attacks based on employment, i.e., the way in which
they are utilized and their intended purposes. Such an approach provides
greater clarity as to which U.S. domestic legal regime will likely govern their
employment. The following section proceeds by first discussing some of the
technical details of cyberattacks and then moves into understanding how
they have been—and likely will be—employed in future conflicts.
Before moving to a discussion of what cyberattacks are, it is important to
note what they are not. They are not cyberexploitation, that is, “the use of
actions and operations . . . to obtain information that would otherwise be
kept confidential . . . . Cyberexploitations are usually clandestine and
conducted with the smallest possible intervention that still allows extraction
84
of the information sought.”
The core difference between attack and
exploitation is in the cyber operation’s purpose; cyberattacks are meant to
be
destructive
whereas
cyberexploitation
acquires
information
85
nondestructively.
While the term offensive cyber operations usually
encompasses both attack and exploitative elements, here “OCO” refers only
86
to attacks.
At the most basic level, a cyberattack requires three elements:
87
vulnerability; access; and payload.
A vulnerability is “an aspect of the
system that can be used by the attacker to compromise” an adversary’s
88
network. Given the increase in the number of complex systems employed
by countries in the past two decades, many cyber defense analysts and
computer experts agree that it is increasingly difficult to foresee and prevent
89
vulnerability exploitation before attacks.
Access refers to the ability to
deliver the payload into the target system such that it exploits the
vulnerability. In particular, access to a target depends on whether the attack
can be launched via remote access (e.g., by hacking into a computer
90
network via the internet) or close access (e.g., attacking a system through

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

extended period of time—to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary
computer systems or networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or
transiting these systems or networks.”).
Lin, supra note 83, at 63.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 83 (giving a technical account of the
technology and operational considerations underpinning contemporary cyber-weapons).
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 87.
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The payload
the “local installation of hardware” via covert operatives).
describes “the things that can be done once a vulnerability has been
exploited. For example, once a software agent (such as a virus) has entered
a given computer, it can be programmed to do many things—reproducing
92
and retransmitting itself, destroying files on the system, or altering files.”
Cyberattacks generally target a system’s integrity (i.e., the system’s ability to
93
operate normally), ability to discern proper authenticity (i.e., the system’s
94
ability to determine whether it should accept incoming data), or its
95
availability (i.e., whether users can properly access the system).
The
resulting effects can be wide-ranging, including destroying data on networks,
generating bogus network traffic, covertly altering data on the network, and
96
degrading or denying service on the network.
Depending on whether the systems being attacked are remote or close
access, a number of assault avenues exist. In an attack on a remote access
97
system, botnets are one of the prominent means of assault. In a botnet
attack, which usually aims to deny users access to the system (such as a
government website in a denial of service or distributed denial of service
attack), bots install themselves on internet-connected computers and then,
responding to commands from a master computer, attack the target by
overloading it with numerous requests for information, such as e-mails,
98
sometimes numbering in the millions.
Because the target cannot
99
sufficiently process the information, it becomes inoperative. Other ways to
attack remote access systems include worms and viruses, which are generally
used to install “trojan horse” systems on many computers that will render
100
those computers inoperable.
Attacking close access systems may generally be more difficult given their
lower degree of accessibility. However, one attack approach involves
inserting malicious software into the supply chain of a system that will
101
eventually become close access.
Such a strategy allows a compromised

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Lin, supra note 83, at 69–70.
Scott Berinato, Attack of the Bots, WIRED, Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.11/botnet.html (detailing how bots conduct
distributed denial of service attacks).
Robb, supra note 27.
For a more in-depth discussion of a bot-net attack, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 70, at 92–96.
Id. at 97.
DEF. SCI. BD. TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
TASK FORCE ON MISSION IMPACT OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON DOD SOFTWARE 22 (2007),
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machine or piece of software to enter into the close access system and then
to be activated at a later point based on a variety of triggering mechanisms.
Other attack routes include inserting compromised universal serial buses
(“USBs”) into close systems. Such an approach can be accomplished either
102
by willing or unwilling insiders.
Hypothetically, scholars and practitioners have postulated a number of
ways in which states might use cyberattacks in future combat scenarios,
103
depending on a wide range of factors.
This process of categorization is
not novel, as U.S. military planners have attempted to produce useful
104
typologies since the mid-1990s.
While many potential categorization
schemas exist, and many involve different types of adversaries,
vulnerabilities, technologies underpinning the attacks, etc., most seem to
focus on a primary element: the relationship of the cyberattack to other
operations. In particular, the schemas differentiate based on whether the
attack is part of a larger, kinetic offensive, or simply an attack launched
independently of such operations. For example, Gregory Rattray and Jason
Healey, in their recent work, suggest multiple ways in which a state could
launch such an attack, but underpinning each is a discussion of whether the
105
attack is part of a larger military operation or conducted independently.

102

103

104

105

available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA486949.pdf (“Net-Centric systems
surely will attract sophisticated adversaries who can subvert the supply chain to replace or
alter software or hardware, recruiting well-placed insiders and exploiting single-string
dependencies.”).
Steve Stasiukonis, Social Engineering, the USB Way, DARK READING (June 7, 2006, 4:15 AM),
http://www.darkreading.com/security/news/208803634/social-engineering-the-uscway.html (detailing a social engineering experiment where a cyber expert scattered
compromised USB drives throughout a parking lot, believing that bank employees would
use them in the bank’s close system and consequently give him access. Over 75% of the
USBs placed in the parking lot were inserted into the bank’s computers).
Gregory Rattray & Jason Healey, Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities
and Their Use, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING
CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 77, 81–
83 (2010) (suggesting that different types of cyberoperations be broken down based on a
wide range of factors including: nature of adversaries, nature of targets, target
physicality, integration with kinetic operations, scope of the effect, intended duration,
openness, context, campaign use, initiation responsibility, and rational, initial timing,
and initiation attack); see also Mike McConnell, Cyber Insecurities: The 21st Century
Threatscape, in 2 AMERICA’S CYBER FUTURE:
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 25 (Kristin M. Lord & Travis Sharp eds., 2011) (detailing how different
types of adversaries—including non-state actors—would use different methods of
cyberattack for different results).
U.S. Air Force, Cornerstones of Information Warfare (1997), available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/usaf/iw/corner.html (describing an early
attempt to classify different types of information warfare).
Rattray & Healey, supra note 103, at 84–91 (describing how cyberattacks could be utilized,
inter alia, as a surprise assault on military targets (with kinetic attacks following), in
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Likewise, William Owens, Kenneth Dam, and Herbert Lin differentiate
between types of cyberattacks that directly support or are in conjunction
106
with military operations, and those conducted independently as covert
107
action.
Further, the distinction between cyberattacks launched independently as
opposed to part of a larger operation properly characterizes most known
cyber operations to date. On the one hand, states have launched a number
108
of attacks in recent years independent of kinetic operations. For example,
the actions in Estonia in 2007—though potentially linked to the Russian
109
government—were independent of any larger military assault.
More
notably, the Stuxnet virus, which inflicted tremendous damage on the
Iranian nuclear energy program by destroying its centrifuge cascades and
much of its Uranium enrichment capability, was launched independent of
110
military action.
Though no nation has taken responsibility for the virus,
most analysts suggest that Israel, with the United States’ help, designed and
111
deployed the virus to hinder Iran’s nuclear development.
On the other
hand, because cyberattacks may make kinetic operations more effective,
112
states have recently employed the two in conjunction.
For example, the
113
alleged Israeli attack on Syria in 2007 —as well as the alleged Russian
114
attack on Georgia in 2008 —both employed cyberattacks in conjunction
with larger operations. In addition, U.S. war planning for Libya also
115
included a cyber component, but only as part of a larger intervention.

106
107
108
109
110

111
112
113
114
115

operational support for traditional, kinetic military operations, in support of special
operations missions, or as stand-alone covert action).
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 177–82.
Id. at 193–98.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 25–32.
Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011,
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104 (detailing, as
substantially as possible without access to TS-SCI information, the employment of the
Stuxnet virus against Iranian Uranium enrichment facilities); see also Sanger, Obama Order
Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 52; David E. Sanger, Iran Fights
Malware Attacking Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at A4 [hereinafter Sanger, Iran
Fights Malware Attacking Computers] (detailing Iran’s continued fight to purge the worm
from its centrifuge control systems); William J. Broad, John Markoff, & David E. Sanger,
Israel Test Called Crucial In Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1 (examining
Israel’s preparations when deploying the worm, in particular, establishing a mock set up
of Iranian nuclear facilities).
Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, supra note 52; Broad,
Markoff, & Sanger, supra note 110.
MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR 146–47 (2009) (detailing how cyber
operation disruption can be effective in conjunction with military operations).
See supra text accompanying notes 40–43.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–39.
Supra text accompanying note 14.
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Given the historical record of cyberattacks and that most of the
theoretical literature categorizes such attacks based on their relationship to
military actions, this Comment divides the attacks into binary categories:
attacks waged independently of other military operations, and attacks waged
as part of a larger military campaign. Though such a distinction may blur as
states employ their capabilities in innovative ways, relying on that distinction
now will aid both in understanding how different U.S. domestic laws apply to
both general categories and in better preparing legal analysts in case of
future cyber operations that do not neatly fit into them. Given this
distinction, the analysis below examines whether current U.S. law effectively
governs offensive cyber operations performed in conjunction with a military
campaign or as a stand-alone operation.

III.

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ARMED FORCES, HOSTILITIES,
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Before proceeding to a discussion of either the War Powers Resolution
or the Intelligence Authorization Act, one must acknowledge the inherent
tension built into the relationship between Congress and the President over
the power to wage war. Notably, the Constitution splits war-making
116
authorities between the congressional and executive branches.
Proponents of executive power suggest that, because the President is the
117
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” he is
vested with the war-making power to determine when and how to deploy
118
U.S. armed forces.
Conversely, Congress has the ability to “declare war,”
“raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” and “provide for
119
calling forth” and organizing and arming the militia.
Further, based on
the Necessary and Proper Clause, some argue that Congress is empowered
to pass legislation in accordance with its constitutional war-making authority
120
specified above. The debate over the extent of each branch’s war-making

116

117
118
119
120

Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 101
(1984) (“Anyone wishing to argue that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is
unconstitutional must be prepared to explain the purpose of article I, section 8, clause
11, of the Constitution. That provision expressly grants to Congress the power ‘To
declare War.’”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT 7–8 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16.
Patrick D. Robbins, Comment, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment,
38 AM. U. L. REV. 141, 148 (1988) (discussing the different constitutional bases of the
Congress’s war-making authority).
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power has shadowed many conflicts in which the United States has been
121
involved.
The intensity of this debate increased considerably during the Vietnam
War, when Congress, uncomfortable with Presidents Johnson and Nixon’s
continuation of the conflict, attempted to rein in presidential power
122
through a series of legislative acts.
The ineffectiveness of these early
123
actions led a Senate committee to propose the War Powers Act in 1972.
After a period of extensive debates in which the language of the original Act
124
was modified, the House of Representatives concurred with the Senate bill
125
and passed the Resolution on October 12, 1973.
On November 7, the
126
House of Representatives overrode President Nixon’s veto of the War
127
Powers Resolution.
128
Congress intended the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”) —passed in
response to the Vietnam War when Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon deployed large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia without a
congressional declaration of war—to limit the President’s power to send
129
U.S. forces into combat without explicit congressional authorization.
130
However, given inherent questions about its constitutionality,
congressional unwillingness to invoke the authority granted to it under the

121
122

123
124

125
126
127
128

129
130

Id. at 150 (“Whatever the Framers’ intent, Presidents in both the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries consistently have tested the limits of their authority to make war.”).
Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers
Resolution, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 736 (1984) (exploring the conflict between the
executive and legislative branches during the Vietnam war); see generally William B. Spong,
Jr., Can Balance be Restored in the Constitutional War Powers of the President and Congress?, 6 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Spong Jr., Can Balance be Restored?] (reviewing war
power proposals by Congress prior to 1972).
S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
For an in-depth discussion of this process, see generally William B. Spong Jr., The War
Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV.
823, 823 (1975) [hereinafter Spong Jr., The War Powers Resolution Revisited] (“Reflecting
unquestionably the divisiveness caused by the nation’s long involvement in Southeast
Asia, this legislative activity, which culminated in the enactment of the War Powers
Resolution of 1973 . . . .”).
119 CONG. REC. 33,858–33,873 (1973).
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-171 (1973).
119 CONG. REC. 36,201–36,222 (1973) (284-135 vote to override).
War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541–1548 (2006)) (“It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment
of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities . . . .”).
See Spong Jr., The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?, supra
note 124, at 824–35; see also Ratner & Cole, supra note 122, at 728–29.
Carter, supra note 116, at 101–02 (debating the constitutional issues undermining the
War Powers Resolution).

Jan. 2013]

EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY

983

131

and the likelihood that deploying
WPR under most circumstances,
offensive cyber activities does not constitute the introduction of armed
132
forces into hostilities (if the hostilities threshold is even met), the War
Powers Resolution is a weak footing upon which to base congressional
oversight of these activities.
The following section provides an overview of the provisions of the War
Powers Resolution, paying particular attention to its reporting and
withdrawal requirements. It then proceeds to discuss the debates over the
Resolution’s effectiveness and constitutionality, noting that while it has
proven ineffective at times, it may not be fatally flawed or unconstitutional.
Following, this section discusses the definitions of key terms, based both on
how they have been interpreted in past historical instances of the
Resolution’s invocation and in the legislative history of the Act. Finally, this
section argues that its terms likely do not cover offensive cyber operations
launched independently or in conjunction with kinetic operations.

A. A Brief Overview of the War Powers Resolution
In the absence of congressional declaration of war, the WPR requires
that:
[T]he President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate
a report, in writing, setting forth—(A) the circumstances necessitating
the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional
and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
133
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

Three circumstances trigger this reporting requirement. If United States
armed forces are introduced: (1) “into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
134
circumstances;” (2) if such forces are introduced “into the territory,
airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except
for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or
135
training of such forces;” and (3) “in numbers which substantially enlarge
United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a

131

132
133
134
135

See generally John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988) (suggesting how Congress could amend the Resolution to
make it more effective); see also RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532,
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2011) [hereinafter GRIMMETT,
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE].
Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–9.
50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006).
Id.
Id.

984

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

136

Beyond requiring the President to submit a report to
foreign nation.”
Congress within forty-eight hours of these specific triggering events, the
WPR also directs the President to withdraw armed forces within sixty days
after the report is submitted or is required to be submitted, unless Congress
has declared war, extended the sixty-day period by law, or is physically
137
unable to meet because of an armed attack against the United States. The
138
President can unilaterally extend this period for an additional thirty days.
In another controversial provision of the Act, Congress, by concurrent
resolution, can order the President to remove U.S. armed forces if they are
engaged in hostilities outside of the United States without a declaration of
139
war or statutory authorization. As discussed below, the constitutionality of
this section (as well as the mandatory sixty-day removal requirement) is
debatable, as the Supreme Court has ruled that legislative vetoes invalidating
executive actions—which these sections arguably constitute—are
140
unconstitutional.
As becomes evident, based on the text of the Resolution, determining
the definitions of “U.S. armed forces,” “hostilities,” “imminent,” and “into
the territory . . . while equipped for combat,” is crucial for concluding
whether the President must report U.S. military activities and remove U.S.
forces after sixty days. Before analyzing whether such definitions might
encompass offensive cyber operations, it is helpful to understand the
primary arguments against the Act, including the routine assertion by
141
Presidents that it is unconstitutional.

B. The Alleged Weaknesses of the War Powers Resolution
Critics of the War Powers Resolution assert two broad critiques: that it is
142
ineffective in practice and that it is unconstitutional.
Regarding the first

136
137
138
139
140

141

142

Id.
50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that
legislative vetoes are unconstitutional). See also Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (asserting that the ruling in
Chadha is meant to be a broad rule and not limited to that case’s particular facts). But see
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378 (1798) (holding that concurrent resolutions do not
require approval by the President).
GRIMMETT, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 131, at 2
(“[E]very President has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by
the Congress on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.”).
For a list of other critiques, see Rostow, supra note 7, at 1–2 (detailing arguments
suggesting that adherence to the War Powers Resolution would wreck the constitutional
balance of power and would “restore the Articles of Confederation as our norm for
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claim, analysts suggest that Presidents simply order operations that
successfully evade WPR reporting and withdrawal requirements, despite the
fact that U.S. soldiers are deployed in situations likely imagined by the
143
In particular, administrations continually argue that
statute’s drafters.
144
situations into which U.S. troops are deployed do not constitute hostilities.
Likewise, some suggest that macro-scale operations of the kind triggering
the War Powers Resolution—where lengthy troop deployments are followed
by crises and subsequent war—are antiquated and unlikely to occur in
145
contemporary times.
Other analysts simply claim that Presidents have
146
ignored the reporting requirements and that members of Congress have
been unwilling to stand up to potentially popular presidential uses of force,
147
even if they clearly violate the WPR. As a result, some analysts believe that
other congressional mechanisms, such as its funding powers, provide the
148
body with stronger oversight ability over executive action.
While many
have critiqued the War Powers Resolution for its apparent ineffectiveness,
this does not necessarily suggest it is has been futile; Presidents have actively
submitted reports pursuant to its requirements and therefore have at least
149
provided Congress with information about their activities.

143

144

145

146

147
148
149

handling the foreign affairs of the nation, and leave the United States drifting helplessly
in stormy seas, naked before its enemies”).
Robbins, supra note 120, at 160–73 (suggesting that the President has undertaken limited
and covert operations, in part, because these can avoid triggering the “hostilities”
element of the War Powers Resolution). See also Michael Mandel, Note, A License to Kill:
America’s Balance of War Powers and the Flaws of the War Powers Resolution, 7 CARDOZO PUB.
L., POL’Y & ETHICS J., 785, 794–805 (2009) (detailing how the War Powers Resolution has
been applied to limited- and large-scale troop deployments).
Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–8; see also Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty
Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY. J. (Apr.
14, 2011, 8:54 AM), http://harvardnsj.org/2011/04/the-cost-of-empty-words-a-commenton-the-justice-departments-libya-opinion/ (critiquing the Obama Administration’s view of
its War Powers duties during the Libya campaign, particularly focusing on the weakness
of the applicable statutes).
Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV.
17, 20 (1995) (suggesting that, in its current form, the War Powers Resolution is
ineffective). The proposition that such large operations are antiquated is dubious,
however, as the United States deployed large numbers of troops to Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, and after a few months launched a military attack against Iraq.
Id. at 19. Through 2009, Presidents have submitted one hundred and twenty-seven
reports pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. However, only one of these cited the
4(a)(1) section of the Act, which triggers the sixty-day time limit. RICHARD GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41199, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY-SIX YEARS
49–69 (2010) [hereinafter GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION].
Id.; see also Ely, supra note 131, at 1384 (“[T]he President has refused to obey the law, and
Congress has not had the fortitude to call him on it.”).
GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970, supra note 81, at 1.
GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, supra note 146, at 49–69.
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In addition to critiquing its effectiveness, administrations and legal
analysts have suggested that the WPR is unconstitutional or suffers from
150
These claims break down into four different
substantial legal problems.
assertions: that the War Powers Resolution infringes on the President’s
commander-in-chief function, based on an original understanding of these
151
provisions by the Framers; that the concurrent resolution constitutes a
legislative veto of an executive action and is therefore unconstitutional
152
under Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha; that members of
Congress do not have standing to bring claims for presidential violations of
153
the WPR; and that enforcement of the WPR presents a non-justiciable
154
claim.
While each of these claims has merit, none is sufficiently definitive as to
whether the Resolution is constitutional or suffers from other fatal legal
flaws. First, good evidence exists to support arguments that the Framers
would have found the Resolution to be consistent with congressional war
155
powers, or conversely, that it infringes upon the Executive’s commander156
in-chief function.
Second, the War Powers Resolution may not constitute a “legislative
157
veto” for the purposes of Chadha.
According to legal scholars, “[t]he

150

151

152
153

154
155

156

157

See generally Carter, supra note 116. Interestingly, the Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S.
Department of Justice has, at times, argued that the War Powers Resolution is
constitutional.
Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory
Authorization, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185 (1980) (“We believe that Congress may, as a
general constitutional matter, place a 60-day limit on the use of our armed forces as
required by . . . the Resolution . . . . We cannot say that placing that burden on the
President unconstitutionally intrudes upon his executive powers.”).
Carter, supra note 116, at 111 (“[The] evidence concerning the original understanding
[of whether the War Powers Resolution would violate the executive’s commander-in-chief
function]—if one indeed chooses to put any faith in that means of constitutional
adjudication—does not come down firmly on one side or the other.”).
Id. at 129–33.
See generally MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30352, WAR POWERS
LITIGATION INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION (2012) (providing a case-by-case overview of the different actions
taken by Congress members to force the President to abide by the War Powers
Resolution).
Id. at 1.
See, e.g., ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
(1976); Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972); Thomas F.
Eagleton, The August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of Congress, 18 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1
(1973).
See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV.
833 (1972) [hereinafter Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law]; J. Terry Emerson, The War
Powers Resolution Tested: The President’s Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
187 (1975).
G. Sidney Buchanan, In Defense of The War Powers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply, 22
HOUS. L. REV. 1155, 1155 n.4 (1985) (suggesting that a legislative veto is “a provision by
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Chadha decision is generally believed to have struck down section 5(c) of the
War Powers Resolution, which permits the Congress to direct the President
to remove the armed from a hostile situation by passage of a concurrent
158
In addition, some argue that Section 5(b) (requiring the
resolution.”
removal of troops after the mandatory sixty-day period without
congressional action, i.e., if only one chamber of Congress does not act) also
159
represents a legislative veto.
In Chadha, the Supreme Court ruled that
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed Congress
to pass a joint resolution forcing the Attorney General to cancel a
deportation, was unconstitutional because it was a legislative veto of
160
executive action. Basing its decision on Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and
3 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that congressional
action meant to have the effect of law must be approved by both houses of
161
Congress and presented to the President for his approval (or disapproval).
In Chadha, “the Court held that § 244(c)(2) [was] unconstitutional because
it authorized one house of Congress to change the legal status quo by action
162
less than that required by the Constitution for a valid law.”
As noted by
Professor Sidney Buchanan however, substantial distinctions exist between
§ 244(c)(2) and the War Powers Resolution. For example, § 244(c)(2)
allowed Congress to change the legal status quo by adjusting the legal status
163
of the immigrant. If, as some scholars argue, the War Powers Resolution is
a codification of legally existing congressional war-making authority, then
the War Powers Resolution does not change the legal status quo but merely
164
fleshes out these powers.
Further, though scholars note that the War
Powers Resolution may be unconstitutional because the action (of forcing
the removal of troops) is not presented to the President for his approval,
165
such presentment may not be required.
In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court suggested that the presentment requirement applies only to

158
159
160

161
162
163
164
165

which Congress reserves to itself a power to affect, by later action less than a law, authority
that it has previously delegated to some other agency or branch of government, typically
to the executive branch or to an administrative agency exercising quasi-legislative, rulemaking authority”).
Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision,
17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 777 (1984).
Id. at 782–93.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983). For a
discussion of the facts of Chadha and the lower courts’ decisions, see Buchanan, supra
note 157, at 1170–73.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946–48.
Buchanan, supra note 157, at 1174.
Id. at 1177. For a discussion of other distinctions, see id. at 1177–79.
Id.
Carter, supra note 116, at 130.
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166

This assertion implies that there may exist
“ordinary” cases of legislation.
cases where legislation does not require presentment before the President
and it is likely that a concurrent resolution in the War Powers Resolution
167
would be extraordinary enough to fall into such a category. As a result, it
is unclear whether the War Powers Resolution represents an impermissible
legislative veto.
Third, courts have suggested that members of Congress may have
168
standing to bring suit based on violations of the War Powers Resolution.
Federal courts have suggested that, if Congress were to pass a resolution
requiring a particular presidential report under the War Powers Resolution,
for example, non-compliance with this resolution would constitute a
169
cognizable claim. As a result, Congress could potentially use the courts to
bring a successful claim for violation of the War Powers Resolution.
Fourth and finally, some federal courts have asserted that the issue of
whether the President refuses to abide by the War Powers Resolution is a
political, non-justiciable question, and therefore the courts cannot rule on
170
the matter.
At the same time, however, courts have also asserted that if a
majority of Congress agreed that the President must abide by the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution in a given circumstance, such
171
consensus would present a justiciable claim to the courts.
As this discussion illustrates, the War Powers Resolution is certainly
flawed. However, it is not necessarily unconstitutional and may serve some

166

167
168

169

170

171

Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 381 n.* (1798) (“The negative of the President
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing to do with the
proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.”).
For this argument, see Carter, supra note 116, at 130–33.
Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1147–48 (D.D.C. 1990); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.
Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(“[W]ere Congress to pass a resolution to the effect that a report was required under the
WPR, or to the effect that the forces should be withdrawn, and the President disregarded
it, a constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be presented.”).
Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 899; see also Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987),
aff’d, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suggesting that if Congress enacted legislation to
enforce the Resolution and the President ignored it, “a question ripe for judicial review”
would be presented); see also GARCIA, supra note 153.
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 770 F.2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to rule on whether the Reagan administration’s actions
triggered the War Powers Resolution because it presented a “nonjusticiable political
question”); see also Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d
1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (asserting that War Powers Resolution enforcement was a political,
not a judicial, question). But see Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 n.5 (D.D.C.
1999), aff’d, 203 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (suggesting that not every violation of the
statute constituted a political question).
Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1150–51 (holding that an injunction could be issued and the
President could be made to comply with the War Powers Resolution if there were
congressional consensus on the issue).
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positive function by alerting Congress to activities undertaken by the
President and giving them the potential opportunity to weigh in, albeit not
likely force the removal of U.S. forces. Thus, it still may prove useful in
helping Congress regulate the use of offensive cyber operations, if it applies
to them.

C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations
As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers
Resolution—especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation—are
the definitions of key terms, particularly “armed forces,” as the relevant
provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President “introduc[es armed
172
forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . . . hostilities,” or if
such forces are introduced “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign
nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate
173
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.”
The
requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed
forces “in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
174
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.”
As is evident,
the definition of “armed forces” is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR
applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over
executive actions. The definition of “hostilities,” which has garnered the
175
majority of scholarly and political attention, particularly in the recent
176
Libyan conflict, will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes
important if “armed forces” exist in the situation.
177
As is evident from a textual analysis, an examination of the legislative
178
179
history, and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,

172
173
174
175

176
177

178

50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of
Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Int’l Sec. and Scientific Affairs of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 38–39 (1975)
(letter from State Dep’t Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh & Dep’t of Def. Gen. Counsel
Martin R. Hoffmann to Chairman Clement J. Zablocki) [hereinafter Leigh & Hoffman]
(defining “hostilities” “to mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are
actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces . . . .”).
Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–8.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the basis of which
meaning is [] most in accord with context and ordinary usage . . . .”).
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226–44 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (illustrating how judges examine legislative history when
interpreting statutes).
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“armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not
weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section
1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term
‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of
members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the
movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any
180
foreign country or government.”
While this definition pertains to the
broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that
only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition
under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a
181
human individual who is part of an organization. Thus, it appears that the
term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed
forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading.
First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of
United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such
182
armed forces.”
By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary—
language, one might argue that the term “armed forces” could include more
than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core
principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression
of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non183
members constituting armed forces).
Second, the term “member” does
not explicitly reference “humans,” and so could arguably refer to individual
units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members
of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that “armed forces”
refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not
determinative.
An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress
clearly conceptualized “armed forces” as human members of the armed
forces. For example, disputes over the term “armed forces” revolved around
who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted
a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution’s architects,
proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution
cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central

179

180
181

182
183

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”).
50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2006).
See, e.g., Member, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/member?s=ts
(last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (defining a “member” as a “person . . . that is part of a society,
party, community, taxon, or other body”).
50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2006) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28–29 (2001).

Jan. 2013]

EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY

991

184

This amendment was dropped after encountering
Intelligence Agency).
185
pushback,
but the debate revolved around whether those military
individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed
forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the
term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the
congressional hearings, the question of deployment of “armed forces”
186
centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,
suggesting that Congress conceptualized “armed forces” to mean U.S.
combat troops.
The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale
187
but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities.
While
examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon
only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further
188
support for those two alternate interpretive sources.
As one scholar has
noted, “[t]he War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with
189
sending U.S. troops into harm’s way.”
The historical context of the War
Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the
resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the
passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to
effectively regulate the President’s deployments of large numbers of U.S.
190
troops to Southeast Asia, as well as prevent the President from authorizing
191
troop incursions into countries in that region. The WPR was a reaction to
the President’s continued deployments of these troops into combat zones,
and as such suggests that Congress’s broad purpose was to prevent the
unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.
This analysis suggests that, when defining the term “armed forces,”
Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in
184
185
186

187
188

189
190
191

Spong Jr., The War Powers Resolution Revisited, supra note 124, at 831.
Id.
Congress, the President, and the War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. Policy
and Scientific Developments of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 124–31 (1970)
[hereinafter Congress, the President, and the War Powers] (statement of John Norton Moore,
Professor of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law).
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).
YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPALS AND RECENT TRENDS, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (2008) (“[T]he Court has begun to
place more emphasis on statutory text and less emphasis on legislative history and other
sources ‘extrinsic’ to that text. More often than before, statutory text is the ending point
as well as the starting point for interpretation.”).
Dycus, supra note 76, at 162.
See, e.g., Ratner & Cole, supra note 122, at 736.
Congress, the President, and the War Powers, supra note 186, at 124–31, 124 (statement of
John Norton Moore, Professor of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law)
(discussing congressional proposals to define the authority of the President to intervene
abroad without congressional consent).
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harm’s way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to
offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the
War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses,
and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question
regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the
operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military
operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For
example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an
activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country,
could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First,
it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not
participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed
192
forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution.
Thus, individual
operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not
constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.
Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is
remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm’s
193
way.
If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target
194
such systems. As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities
or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities—which is
highly unlikely—such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

IV.

THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT: COVERT ACTIONS
AND THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES EXEMPTION

Stemming from similar tension noted in the constitutional division of
war-making authority noted above, congressional oversight of covert actions
beyond intelligence collection has often proved a point of contention
195
between the executive and legislative branches. Presidents have “inferred
authority [to conduct covert actions] from such places as the Vesting Clause,
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the Treaty Clause, and from an implied
196
executive privilege.”

192

193
194
195

196

127 CONG. REC. 3743 (1981) (asserting that the hostility requirement is not triggered if
personnel “will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany . . . forces in combat,
on operational patrols, or in any other situation where combat is likely”); see also Leigh &
Hoffman, supra note 175 at 38–40.
See notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
See notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
See generally A. John Radsan, An Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 485,
517–37 (2009) (detailing the development since 1947 of the congressional legal actions
meant to limit executive covert actions).
Id. at 517.
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Likewise, Congress attempted to rein in the President’s ability to conduct
covert operations without oversight by implementing a series of laws that
197
required the President to get approval before undertaking such activities.
If the President did not provide such notification, Congress could decline to
198
fund that particular covert activity.
Following the revelation that
widespread, unreported covert actions were undertaken during the Vietnam
War, Congress moved for stricter control of executive power, both by forcing
the executive to account for the money it was spending as part of annual
199
authorization bills and by streamlining its own oversight capability by
tasking two primary committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, with
200
oversight.
While Congress designed this legislation to rein in the President’s power
to conduct covert activities without oversight, events in the 1980s clearly
201
showed that its efforts had been ineffective. In particular, the Iran-Contra
affair illustrated that Congress needed to substantially reform oversight
legislation to ensure that it could properly monitor executive covert
202
action.
As a result, in 1990, Congress began drafting a new oversight bill,
197

198

199

200

201

202

Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Hughes-Ryan Act), Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, § 662, 88
Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1976)), repealed by
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429. The
Hughes-Ryan Act, as amended, provided:
No funds appropriated under the authority of this chapter or any other Act may
be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in
foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is
important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees
of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the United States
House of Representatives.
Id.
Rasdan, supra note 195, at 522. (“Congress, by receiving notice of covert actions, could
try to block an action it deemed inappropriate by denying funds to carry out the
action.”).
Marshall Silverberg, The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA’s Covert Operations, 68
TEX L. REV. 575, 596 (1990) (“This Act for the first time placed the CIA and the other
intelligence agencies under congressional authorization and appropriation
procedures.”).
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407(a),
§ 407(b)(1), § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 413 (2000)); see also Rasdan, supra note 195, at 525–27.
Indeed, Congress itself remarked, in legislation meant to remedy its oversight failures
associated with Iran-Contra, that “[u]nder current law . . . the Congressional mandate is
ambiguous, confusing and incomplete. . . . The statutory requirements for informing the
intelligence committees of covert actions are subject to misinterpretation, and the scope
of activities covered by the law is undefined.” S. REP. NO. 102-85, § 503, at 34 (1991).
See generally Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair,
S. REP. NO. 100-216 (1987), H.R. REP. NO. 100-433 (1987) (detailing the Iran-Contra
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the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, which grants Congress oversight
203
Section 413b of the Intelligence Authorization Act
of covert activities.
provides,
To the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from
unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive
intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive
matters, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and entities of the United States Government
involved in a covert action . . . shall keep the [congressional] intelligence
204
committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions . . . .

The Act further provides that the President must ensure that any covert
action that falls under the scope of the Act is reported to Congress “as soon
as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert
205
action” unless “the President determines that it is essential to limit access
to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of
206
the United States.”
Moreover, if the President does not fully inform the
intelligence committees prior to the action, he or she “shall fully inform the
[congressional] intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall
207
provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.”
Congress, recognizing that the power of the statute turned—to a
substantial degree—on the definition of covert action, provided guidance
both in the legislation and the committee reports as to what the term meant.
According to the statute, “the term ‘covert action’ means an activity or
activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic,
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
208
publicly.”
Congress also provided a list of exceptions to the term,
however, specifically noting that, inter alia, “activities the primary purpose of
which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities,

203
204
205
206
207

208

scandal and resulting investigation); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always
Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988)
[hereinafter Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs] (arguing that the
Iran-Contra Affair was symbolic of the inadequacies of America’s foreign affairs policies).
50 U.S.C. §§ 413b(c)(2), 413b(d) (2006).
50 U.S.C. § 413b(b) (2006).
50 U.S.C. § 413b(c) (2006).
Id.
Id. Interestingly, President George H.W. Bush, when signing the bill, suggested that
“timely fashion” did not mean within forty-eight hours, as specified in the Act. Rather, he
suggested that “[i]n those rare instances where prior notice is not provided, I anticipate
that notice will be provided within a few days. Any withholding beyond this period would
be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by the Constitution.”
Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1609, 1611 (Nov. 30, 1989).
50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
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traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of
United States Government programs, or administrative activities,” as well as
“traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such
209
activities,” do not constitute covert action.
While an initial textual reading of these exceptions—especially
traditional military activities (“TMAs”)—suggests that they are extremely
broad, an examination of the Act’s legislative history suggests that they are
narrower than they first appear. In particular, as University of Texas law
professor Robert Chesney notes, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence’s (“SSCI”) committee report associated with the legislation,
went on to make clear that the SSCI assumed that U.S. government
responsibility ‘would be apparent or acknowledged at the time of the
military operation.’ When that was not the case—i.e. when “military
elements not identifiable to the United States [are] used to carry out an
operation abroad without ever being acknowledged by the United
210
States”—the operation would not constitute TMA.

This original understanding led to an odd result, whereby “the TMA
exemption did no work, as the definition of covert action already excluded
211
operations in which the U.S. role was intended to be acknowledged.”
To
remedy this issue, the committees proposed, and President Bush ultimately
212
accepted, a compromise whereby an unacknowledged operation could fall
under the traditional military activities exemption by meeting two
213
requirements:
first, the TMA must be commanded and executed by
military personnel; and second, the TMA must take place in a context in
which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated, meaning approval
has been given by the National Command Authority (which consists of the
President and the Secretary of Defense) for the activities and for the
214
operational planning for hostilities.
Further, according to Chesney,
“[o]perational planning can and normally will begin far earlier than the eve
of conflict or even the eve of a deployment in anticipation of combat. . . .
[T]he ‘operational planning’ standard . . . is not nearly as restrictive . . . as
215
the casual reader might assume.”

209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Chesney, supra note 76, at 595.
Id. at 595–96.
Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 598–99.
S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991).
Chesney, supra note 76, at 599–600.
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A. The Intelligence Authorization Act as Applied to Offensive Cyber
Operations
Given the language of the statute and the elaboration on its language
provided by the legislative history, would offensive cyber operations—either
used independently or in conjunction with a military campaign—trigger the
notification requirements of the Intelligence Authorization Act? Looking
first at cyber operations used prior to—or in conjunction with—military
campaigns, the President would not need to report these to Congress under
§ 413b. Interestingly, depending on how the United States decides to
conduct its offensive cyber operations, they may not even constitute covert
actions under 413b, before even reaching the question of whether they fall
under the exemptions. The statute’s definition of covert actions requires
that the United States not intend its role be “apparent or acknowledged
216
publicly.”
If, for example, the United States were to launch an attack
using proxy forces—similar to the alleged Russian attack against Georgia in
the 2008 war—it would likely constitute a covert action because the United
States would be attempting to hide its role. Conversely, in the Israeli case,
Israel likely did not intend for its computer attack against Syrian air defenses
to remain hidden; indeed, by the overall attack’s public nature, it seemed
likely that information about the cyberattack preceding the military strike
would be revealed. Likewise, if the United States in the lead-up to the Libya
intervention had launched a cyberattack against the Libyan air defense
network, it might also have failed to constitute covert action because of the
likelihood that the third party observers would understand that a cyberattack
occurred. Further, in the Israeli case and the Libya hypothetical, Israel and
the United States clearly did not intend to hide their roles, as they followed
the cyberattacks (or considered attacks) by openly striking targets within
those countries.
If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was
part of a larger military operation, such an attack would likely fall into the
“traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such
217
activities” exception provided in the statute.
To qualify as a traditional
military activity, the TMA must be commanded and executed by military
personnel and take place in a context in which overt hostilities are either
ongoing or anticipated, meaning approval has been given by the National
Command Authority for the activities and for the operational planning for
218
hostilities.
Given that the National Security Agency, responsible for the
development and deployment of U.S. cyber capabilities, is co-housed and
216
217
218

50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991).
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extensively shares personnel with U.S. Cyber Command, the military
command tasked with launching cyberattacks against adversaries, it seems
219
likely that any such attack will satisfy the first prong of the test.
Regarding the second prong, cyber operations conducted prior to, or in
conjunction with, military operations may also take place in a context in
which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated. First, using the
Russian activities in the 2008 war with Georgia as the basis for a factual
hypothetical, if the United States were to conduct similar operations parallel
to kinetic operations, such activity would be taking place in the context of
overt hostilities. Though the level of hostilities is important in determining
220
whether “overt hostilities” exist, a Georgian-style conflict would likely
221
trigger this exception.
Though one might argue, as the Obama
administration did in the 2011 Libyan intervention, that its actions did not
constitute hostilities (and therefore did not trigger the War Powers
Resolution’s reporting requirement), that argument does not hold force
here because the Obama Administration was referring to the period after
United States airmen were engaging in direct strikes against Libyan ground
222
forces (and after all of Libya’s air defenses were effectively destroyed). By
inference, the period in which U.S. forces were striking Libyan targets did
constitute hostilities.
Therefore, these cyber operations, used in
conjunction with military operations, would likely fall under the TMA
exception.
If the cyberattacks were used prior to the commencement of hostilities
(for example if the United States launched OCOs to disable Libya’s air
defense network), they would also likely fall under the language of the
exception because the National Command Authority would have given
approval both for the activities and operational planning for the hostilities.
While this might seem like a high burden, National Command Authority
223
consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense.
Thus the

219

220
221

222

223

Chesney, supra note 76, at 581 (“CYBERCOM and NSA are co-located at Fort Meade, they
share some personnel (many of whom are trained in procedures meant to preserve a
distinction between their actions as CYBERCOM personnel and their potentially-identical
actions wearing their hats as NSA personnel), and both are (and must be) headed by the
same official (currently General Keith Alexander).”).
See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
Roger N. McDermott, Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War, PARAMETERS,
Spring 2009, at 65–67 (providing a short overview of the military elements of Russia’s
attack on Georgia).
Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7–9 (“The situation in Libya does not constitute a war
requiring specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause of the
Constitution.”).
Dep’t of Def., Directive Number 5100.30, § 3.1 (Dec. 2, 1971) (“The NCA consists only of
the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or
successors.”).
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President and the Secretary of Defense must only approve the activities in
anticipation of overt hostilities. Further, because operational planning can
simply constitute planning for a “situation that likely would involve military
forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives,
military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the
224
National Command Authority for operational
President or SecDef,”
planning does not require the President and the Secretary of Defense to
prepare to commence overt hostilities, but rather they can simply conduct
contingency planning for a wide range of scenarios. Further, in a
circumstance where the United States is prepared to actively intervene in
another country, such as Libya, it would be clear that overt hostilities are
anticipated, even in circumstances where overt hostilities are not imminent.
In such a scenario, the President is merely considering future action and
planning accordingly, and thus such offensive cyber operations would likely
fall under the Traditional Military Activities exception.
Offensive cyber operations might also be exempt under the routine
support exception. If the activity is “routine support” to “traditional
225
diplomatic or military activities,” it does not constitute covert action.
Though the legislation does not define “routine,” the Senate committee
suggested it involved a subjective element and that providing pertinent
226
examples might be useful.
According to the committee, the term “would
include various forms of logistical support that might be useful in placing
personnel inside a denied area and enabling them to act without detection,
including false documents, communications gear, safe houses,
227
transportation, and information.”
Interestingly, these examples seem to
reference support to covert activities, not necessarily traditional military
activities (i.e. helping to facilitate individuals to act without detection).
However, if these activities are meant to support traditional military
activities, then the language seems likely to encompass cyberattacks in
preparation for military attacks against a target. For example, if the United
States had launched OCOs against Libya to disable its air defense network in
preparation of an allied air attack, this might be similar to aiding personnel
in gaining access to a denied area (in this case, the personnel would be U.S.
aircraft and the associated crewmen and the denied area would be airspace
denied because of the defenses protecting it). While ambiguity certainly
exists as to whether such a cyber operation would constitute routine support,
224
225
226
227

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Joint Operational Planning, JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0, Aug. 11, 2011, at
xvii–xviii.
50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
Chesney, supra note 76, at 596. See also S. REP. NO. 101-358, at 54 (1990) (providing
examples of what the Committee would regard as “routine support”).
Chesney, supra note 76, at 596.
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offensive cyber operations conducted prior to—or in conjunction with—
kinetic operations likely do fall under the covert action exemption.
Likewise, offensive cyber operations conducted independently of military
operations, though likely constituting covert action, are also likely exempt
under the Traditional Military Activities exception. Imagine, for example,
that the United States launched the Stuxnet worm that attacked Iran’s
nuclear enrichment capabilities without Israeli involvement. Further
imagine that all other facts in the case were the same as they are in reality
(i.e. the United States denied its involvement in the attack). In such a case,
the attack seems to constitute a covert action that requires reporting to the
congressional intelligence committees because it was an activity to influence
political conditions (i.e. the Iranian ability or decision to develop its nuclear
program) or military conditions (i.e. preventing the Iranians from moving
forward with the development of a nuclear weapon, which could
228
substantially bolster their military capability) abroad. Further, the United
229
States did not intend for its role to be apparent or publicly acknowledged.
Despite falling into this category, however, such an offensive operation,
for the reasons discussed above, likely satisfies the congressional test for a
traditional military activity. First, because General Alexander is the
commander of both CYBERCOM and the head of the National Security
Agency and because many of the personnel are dual-hatted at the respective
organizations, any offensive cyber operation conducted independently of a
230
kinetic assault will be commanded and executed by military personnel.
Second, because the President can launch offensive cyber operations
231
without congressional notification if they are in anticipation of hostilities,
he also has great flexibility in deciding whether to report his activities. For
example, if the President were to order the launch of a Stuxnet-style attack
against Iran to degrade its nuclear enrichment capability, such an activity
would—assuming it was done with the Secretary of Defense’s consent—
necessarily constitute approval by the National Command Authority. In
addition, because the definition of operational planning—another element
required in fulfilling the TMA exception to the definition of covert action—
is so broad, such an attack would likely fall within its purview. The President
would simply argue that approval has been given for operational planning of
future combat operations with Iran (which it almost certainly has in the U.S.
232
military) and therefore the activity was taking place in the context where
228
229
230
231
232

50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991).
Id.
See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Annie Lowrey, Iran Threatens to Block Oil Shipments, as U.S.
Prepares Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/world/
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overt hostilities are anticipated. Indeed, only in a situation where no
contingency planning has occurred—such as with an ally or a country that
the United States takes little interest—would this exception not apply.
As a result, it becomes evident that even a Stuxnet-type of attack likely
will not trigger the requirements set forth in the Intelligence Authorization
Act. Given the dual-hatted nature of many NSA and CYBERCOM personnel,
as well as the fact that action approved by the President and the Secretary of
Defense necessarily constitutes approval by the National Command
Authority, all the executive branch must realistically show is that it
undertook the operation in a context where operational planning had
occurred for potential hostilities at some undefined point in the future.
This hurdle is very low and the executive should have little problem clearing
it.
These limited requirements suggest that the executive can easily argue
that offensive cyber operations conducted both as independent actions and
in conjunction with kinetic operations likely fall under the Traditional
Military Activity exception to the definition of covert action as provided by
the Intelligence Authorization Act. As a result, the President is likely not
statutorily required to report any offensive cyberattacks under the Act.

V. A MIDDLE GROUND OF LEGAL OVERSIGHT
This analysis suggests that, given inherent weaknesses in the underlying
statutory schemes, excluding offensive cyber operations from their scope
does not substantially shift the balance of war-making authority between the
President and Congress. This exclusion does, however, provide the
President additional, powerful means by which to conduct military action
without congressional oversight.
Based on analysis of the War Powers Resolution, the lack of oversight for
OCOs does not radically shift the balance between the legislative and
executive branches’ war-making authority. Most notably, because the War
Powers Resolution itself has proven ineffective in providing Congress with a
powerful tool to govern presidential use of force, bringing OCOs under the
War Powers Resolution’s statutory umbrella likely would not provide the
possibility of such oversight. However, insofar as the President has
increasingly turned to covert action since the passage of the War Powers
233
Resolution to avoid its reporting requirements, offensive cyber operations

233

middleeast/iran-threatens-to-block-oil-route-if-embargo-is-imposed.html
(“In
recent
interviews, Obama administration officials have said that the United States has developed
a plan to keep the strait[s] [of Hormuz] open in the event of a crisis.”).
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, supra note 202, at 1273
(arguing that the WPR “only drove [executive war-making] underground, stimulating the
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provide the President another means by which to continue this trend.
OCOs therefore may give the President substantially more flexibility than he
already has under the War Powers Resolution by adding what will become an
increasingly frequent tool of warfare to his option-set.
The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under
the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the
balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The
reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence
Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the
234
non-use or withdrawal of forces. Further, these reports must be made in a
“timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small
235
number of Congressmen (at most eight).
Thus even if the President had
to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have
to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports
would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be
able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other
members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of
these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential
flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization
Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased
congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop
deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive
cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign
policy tool outside congressional reach.
Should these statutes be adjusted (or new ones created) that give
Congress additional oversight in this area? Two competing desiderata
suggest that oversight should be increased, but only to a limited extent. On
the one hand, policymakers have suggested that developing strict rules and
limitations on the use of offensive cyber operations will handicap the
military’s ability to quickly and effectively employ these tools in critical
236
situations, such as cyber warfare against adversarial states.
According to
these arguments, developing red lines that proscribe the use of these
capabilities will create reluctance and trepidation among strategists and will
237
lead to disadvantages in combat situations.
On the other hand,
developing some legal rules is necessary to ensure that, as these cyber

234
235
236
237

Executive to substitute covert for overt operations and to transfer control of those
operations from the military establishment to the intelligence agencies, particularly the
CIA”).
50 U.S.C. § 413b (2006).
Dycus, supra note 76, at 160.
Baker, supra note 24.
Id.
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capabilities continue to develop, the President does not gain sufficient
leverage to substantially tilt the balance between the President and
Congress. Moreover, because these capabilities are still developing at a fast
rate, understanding how they should and should not be employed is an
important goal and having senior members of Congress and their staffs—
professional staff members on the intelligence committees, who likely have
substantial experience in these areas—provide input would be useful in
developing this understanding.
These competing arguments—one for limiting any oversight and one for
increasing it—suggest a middle ground that will avoid drawing red lines but
will still provide useful congressional insight into the doctrinal and legal
development of offensive cyber operations. Such an approach would
include new legislation, similar to the Intelligence Authorization Act,
explicitly requiring the President to report its use of covert cyber activities to
the heads of Senate and House intelligence committees (i.e. the Gang of
238
Eight). Congress would not have the ability to veto such actions, however
it would be able to raise potential legal issues with the executive branch, as
well as provide policy advice as to the wisdom of employing these capabilities
in such circumstances. As a result, while the heads of these committees
would not have the ability to draw red lines themselves, they would be able
to consult with the executive branch—as the branch employs these
capabilities—to determine their likely legality and wisdom. While the
President could ignore this advice, such an approach would at the very least
keep Congress informed of the developing capabilities and their
employment. With such an approach, Congress could play a meaningful
role in the shifting and uncertain legal and policy realms of offensive cyber
operations, which will undoubtedly become increasingly important as the
United States and other nations develop and employ these capabilities with
ever-greater frequency.
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